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Abstract
This paper initiates a study into the century-old issue of market predictability from the
perspective of computational complexity. We develop a simple agent-based model for a stock
market where the agents are traders equipped with simple trading strategies, and their trades
together determine the stock prices. Computer simulations show that a basic case of this
model is already capable of generating price graphs which are visually similar to the recent
price movements of high tech stocks. In the general model, we prove that if there are a large
number of traders but they employ a relatively small number of strategies, then there is a
polynomial-time algorithm for predicting future price movements with high accuracy. On the
other hand, if the number of strategies is large, market prediction becomes complete in two new
computational complexity classes CPP and BCPP, where PNP[O(logn)] ⊆ BCPP ⊆ CPP = PP.
These computational completeness results open up a novel possibility that the price graph of an
actual stock could be sufficiently deterministic for various prediction goals but appear random
to all polynomial-time prediction algorithms.
1 Introduction
The issue of market predictability has been debated for more than a century (see [7] for earlier
papers and [5, 12, 15, 17] for more recent viewpoints). In 1900, the pioneering work “Theory of
Speculation” of Louis Bachelier used Brownian motion to analyze the stochastic properties of
security prices [7]. Since then, Brownian motion and its variants have become textbook tools for
modeling financial assets. Relatively recently, the radically different methodology of Mandelbrot
used fractals to approximate price graphs deterministically [18]. In this paper, we initiate a study
into this long-running issue from the perspective of computational complexity.
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We develop a simple agent-based model for a stock market [8, 16]. The agents are traders
equipped with simple trading strategies, and their trades together determine the stock prices. We
first consider a basic case of this model where there are only two strategies, namely, momentum
and contrarian strategies. The choice of this base model and thus our general model is justified at
two levels: (1) Experimental and empirical studies in the finance literature [1, 4, 6, 9–11, 14] show
that a large number of traders primarily follow these two strategies. (2) Our own simulation results
show that despite its simplicity, the base model is capable of generating price graphs which are
visually similar to the recent price movements of high tech stocks (Figures 1 and 2).
With these justifications, we then consider the issue of market predictability in the general
model. We prove that if there are a large number of traders but they employ a relatively small
number of strategies, then there is a polynomial-time algorithm to predict future price movements
with high accuracy (Theorem 5). On the other hand, if there are also a large number of strategies,
then the problem of predicting future prices becomes computationally very hard. To describe this
hardness, we define two new computational complexity classes called CPP and BCPP (Definitions
8 and 9). We show that some market prediction problems are complete for these two classes
(Theorems 16 and 17) and that PNP[O(logn)] ⊆ BCPP ⊆ CPP = PP.
These computational completeness results open up the possibility that the price graph of an
actual stock could be sufficiently deterministic for various prediction purposes but appear random
to all polynomial-time prediction algorithms. This is in contrast to the most popular academic
belief that the future price of a stock cannot be predicted from its historical prices because the
latter are statistically random and contain no information. This new viewpoint also differs from
the fractal-based methodology in that the price graph of a stock could be a fractal but the fractal
might not be computable in polynomial time. The findings in this paper can by no means settle
the debate on market predictability. Our goal is only that this alternative approach could provide
new insights to the predictability issue in a systematic manner. In particular, it could provide a
general framework to investigate the many documented technical trading rules [20] and to generate
novel and significant interdisciplinary research problems for computer science and finance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the basic market model. Sec-
tion 3 formulates the general model. Section 4 proves the complexity results for market prediction
in the general model. We conclude the paper with some directions for future research in Section 5.
2 A Basic Market Model
In this section, we present a very simple market model, called the deterministic-switching MC
(DSMC) model. The letter M stands for a momentum strategy, and the letter C for a contrarian
strategy. These two strategies and the model itself are defined in Section 2.1. Some computer
simulations for this model are reported in Section 2.2.
Intuitively, these strategies are heuristics (“rules of thumb”) used by traders in the absence of
reliable asset valuation models. As discussed in [11], a momentum trader may observe a sequence
of “up” trades (price increments) and execute a buy trade in the anticipation that she will not
be one of the last buyers, knowing very well that the asset is overpriced. Similarly, she may see
some “down” trades (price decrements) and then make a sell trade in the hope that there will be
more sellers after her. In contrast, after detecting a number of “up” (respectively, down) trades, a
contrarian trader may submit a sell (respectively, buy) trade, anticipating a price reversal.
Both experimental and empirical studies have shown that traders look at past price dynamics
to form their expectations of future prices, and a large number of them primarily follow momentum
or contrarian strategies [1, 6, 9, 10]. In addition, the traders may switch between these two diamet-
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rically opposite strategies. Momentum and contrarian strategies are dominant in the behavior of
professional market timers as well [14]. The use of momentum and contrarian strategies sometimes
signifies gambling tendencies among traders [6]. In fact, a market model with momentum and
contrarian traders can also be interpreted as a market with noise traders and rational traders,
where the noise traders essentially follow a momentum strategy while the rational traders attempt
to exploit the noise traders by following a contrarian strategy [4, 11].
2.1 Defining the DSMC Model
In the DSMC model, there is only one stock traded in the market. The model is completely
specified by three integer parameters m,L, k > 0, and a real parameter α > 0 as follows.
There are m traders in the market, and each trader’s strategy set consists of momentum (M)
and contrarian (C) strategies. At the beginning of day 1 of the investment period, each trader
randomly chooses her initial strategy from {M, C} and an integer ℓi ∈ [2, L] with equal probability,
where L is the maximum strategy switching period. This is the only source of randomness in the
DSMC model; from this point onwards, there is no random choice.
Rule 1 (Deterministic Strategy Switching Rule) For days 1, . . . , k + 1, there is no trading.
Each trader starts trading from day k+2 using her initial strategy. Trader i uses the same strategy
for ℓi days and switches it at the beginning of every ℓi days.
The next rule defines the two strategies with respect to a given memory size k, which is the
same for all traders.
Rule 2 (Trading Rule) At the beginning of day t, observe the stock prices Pf of days f ∈
[t − (k + 1), t − 1]. For g ∈ [t − k, t − 1], count the number ku of days g when Pg > Pg−1; and
the number kd of days when Pg < Pg−1. The k-day trend is defied as Tr(k, t) = ku − kd. Then, if
Tr(k, t) ≥ 0 (respectively, < 0), the momentum strategy M buys (respectively, sells) one share of
the stock at the market price determined by Rule 3 below. In contrast, the contrarian strategy C
sells (respectively, buys) one share of the stock.
For instance, suppose that k = 2, and investor i picks her initial strategy M and ℓi = 2 at the
beginning of day 1. She then observes the prices of days 1, 2, 3, which are, say, $80, $82, $90. At
the beginning of day 4, she issues a market order to buy one share of the stock. The orders issued
by the traders on day 4 together determine the price of day 4 as specified by Rule 3. Suppose that
the price of day 4 is $91, then investor i issues another market buy order at the beginning of day
5. Since her ℓi is 2, at the beginning of day 6, she switches her strategy from M to C.
Rule 3 (Price Adjustment Rule) The prices for days 1, . . . , k+1 are given. On day t ≥ k+2,
let mb and ms be the total numbers of buys and sells, respectively. Then, the price Pt on day t is
determined by the following equation:
Pt − Pt−1 = α·(mb −ms),
where α is the unit of price change.
3
0 50 100 150 200 250
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Figure 1: A one-year price sequence generated using the DSMC model. Parameters: number of
traders m = 20, memory size k = 2, maximum strategy switching period L = 8, unit of price
change α = 0.25, number of trading days = 250. The price graph appears strikingly similar to the
recent price movements of high tech stocks.
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Figure 2: A one-year price sequence generated using the DSMC model. The parameters are the
same as those for Figure 1.
4
2.2 Computer Simulation on the DSMC Model
We have conducted some computer simulations of the DSMC model to test whether it can generate
realistic price graphs. Because we had to examine the graphs visually, our time constraints limited
the number of these simulations to only about six hundred. For a large fraction of them, we set
m = 20, L = 8, and the initial k prices in the range of $70 to $90. We then focused on testing the
effect of memory size k [19]. Two main findings are as follows:
• For k = 1, the price graphs were not visually real.
• For k = 2, about one out of four graphs were strikingly similar to those of recent high tech
stocks, which was a major positive surprise to us. Two representatives of such graphs are
shown in Figures 1 and 2.
These two statements are based on our subjective impressions and limited simulations. To
further understand the DSMC model, it would be useful to automate statistical analysis on the
price graphs generated by this model and compare them with real stock prices.
3 A General Market Model
In this section, we define a market model, called the AS model, where the word AS stands for
arbitrary strategies. It can be verified in a straightforward manner that the DSMC model is a
special case of the AS model.
In the AS model, there is only one stock traded in the market. The model is completely specified
as follows with five parameters: (1) the number m of traders, (2) a unit α > 0 of price change, (3)
a set Π = {S1, . . . ,Sh} of strategies, (4) a price adjustment rule (Equation 1 or 2 below), and (5)
a joint distribution of the population variables X1, . . . ,Xh.
Rule 4 (Market Initialization) There are m traders in the market. At the beginning of day 1
of the investment period, each trader randomly chooses her initial strategy from Π. Let Xi be the
number of traders who choose Si. Then, each Xi is a random variable, which is the only source
of randomness in the model. (Unlike the DSMC model, because the allowable generality of Π, the
AS model does not need strategy switching.)
Different joint distributions of the variables Xi lead to different specific models and prediction
problems. In Section 4.2, we consider joint distributions that tend to Gaussian in the limit as the
number m of traders becomes large. In Section 4.3, we consider the case where the variables Xi
are independent, and each is 0 or 1 with equal probability.
Rule 5 (Trading Strategies) There is no trading on day 0. At the beginning of day t ≥ 1, a
trader observes the historical prices P0, . . . , Pt−1 and reacts by issuing a market order to buy one
share of the stock, hold (i.e., do nothing), or sell one share according her strategy. Formally, a
strategy is a collection of functions S = {S1,S2, . . . ,St, . . .}, where each St maps P0, . . . , Pt−1 to
+1 (buy), 0 (hold), or −1 (sell).
The price Pt of day t is determined at the end of the day by the day’s m market orders
using Rule 6. Since the traders choose their strategies randomly, the sequence P0, P1, . . . , Pt, . . .
is a stochastic process. We write Ft for the probability space induced by all possible sequences
〈P0, . . . , Pt〉 [13]. Then, we think of each function St as a random variable on Ft−1.
We distinguish between strategies that react to price movements and those that ignore them.
5
• S is an active strategy if the functions St may or may not be constant functions. An active
trader is one with an active strategy.
• S is a passive strategy if the functions St all are constant functions. A passive trader is one
with a passive strategy.
Rule 6 (Price Adjustment) The price P0 is given. At the end of day t ≥ 1, the price Pt is
determined by the day’s market orders to buy or sell from the traders. We consider two simple
rules:
With the proportional increment (PI) rule,
Pt = Pt−1 + α·
h∑
i=1
Xi·Sit , (1)
where α is the unit of price change. Thus we can observe directly the net difference between the
number of buyers and sellers on day t.
With the fixed increment (FI) rule,
Pt = Pt−1 + α· sign
(
h∑
i=1
Xi·Sit
)
. (2)
In this case, the market moves up or down depending on whether the majority of traders are buying
or selling, but the amount by which it moves is fixed at α.
For notational brevity, an AS+FI model refers to an AS model with the fixed increment rule,
and an AS+PI model refers to an AS model with the proportional increment rule.
In reality, the price tends to move up if there are more buy orders than sell orders; similarly,
the price tends to move down if there are more sell orders than buy orders. The FI rule is meant to
model the sign but not the magnitude of the slope of this correlation, while the PI rule attempts to
model both. Clearly, there can be many other increment rules, which this paper leaves for future
research.
4 Predicting the Market
Informally, the market prediction problem at the beginning of day t is defined as follows:
• The data consists of (1) the five parameters of an AS-model, i.e., m, α, Π, Xi, and a price
adjustment rule, and (2) a price history P0, . . . , Pt−1.
• The goal is to predict the price Pt by estimating the conditional probabilities Pr[Pt > Pt−1 |
P0, . . . , Pt−1], Pr[Pt < Pt−1 | P0, . . . , Pt−1], and Pr[Pt = Pt−1 | P0, . . . , Pt−1].
Note that Pr[Pt > Pt−1 | P0, . . . , Pt−1] is symmetric to Pr[Pt < Pt−1 | P0, . . . , Pt−1] and Pr[Pt =
Pt−1 | P0, . . . , Pt−1] = 1 − Pr[Pt > Pt−1 | P0, . . . , Pt−1] − Pr[Pt < Pt−1 | P0, . . . , Pt−1]. Thus, from
this point onwards, our discussion focuses on estimating Pr[Pt > Pt−1 | P0, . . . , Pt−1].
From an algorithmic perspective, we sometimes assume that the price adjustment rule and the
joint distribution of the variables Xi are fixed, and that the input to the algorithm is m, α, a
description of Π, and the price history. This allows different algorithms for different model families
as well as side-steps the issue of how to represent the possibly very complicated joint distribution of
the variables Xi as part of the input. As for the description of Π, we only need Si1, . . . ,Sit for each
Si ∈ Π instead of the whole Π, and the description of these functions can simplified by restricting
their domains to consist of the price sequences consistent with the given price history.
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4.1 Markets as Systems of Linear Constraints
In the AS+FI model with parameters m and α, a price sequence P0, . . . , Pt and Π can yield a set
of linear inequalities in the population variables Xi as follows. If the price changes on day t, we
have
sign(Pt − Pt−1)
h∑
i=1
SitXi > 0. (3)
If the price does not change, we have instead the equation
h∑
i=1
SitXi = 0. (4)
Furthermore, any assignment of the variables Xi that satisfies either inequality is feasible with
respect to the corresponding price movement on day t. In both cases, Sit is computable from the
price sequence P0, . . . , Pt−1. The same statements hold for days 1, . . . , t − 1. Therefore, given m
and α, we can extract from Π and P0, . . . , Pt a set of linear constraints on the variables Xi. The
converse holds similarly. We formalize these two observations in Lemmas 1 and 2 below.
Lemma 1 In the AS+FI model with parameters m and α, given Π and a price sequence P0, . . . , Pβ ,
there are matrices A and B with coefficients in {−1, 0,+1}, h columns each, and β rows in total.
The rows of A (respectively, B) correspond to the days when Pj 6= Pj−1 (respectively, Pj = Pj−1).
Furthermore. the column vectors x = (X1, . . . ,Xh)
⊤ consistent with Π and P0, . . . , Pβ are exactly
those that satisfy Ax > 0 and Bx = 0. The matrices A and B can be computed in time O(hβT ),
where T is an upper bound on the time to compute a single Sij from P0, . . . , Pβ over all j ∈ [1, β]
and Si.
Proof: Follows immediately from Equations 3 and 4.
Lemma 2 In the AS+FI model with parameters m and α, given a system of linear inequalities
Ax > 0, Bx = 0, where A and B have coefficients in {−1, 0,+1} with h columns each, and β rows
in total, there exist (1) a set Π of h strategies corresponding to the h columns of A and B, and
(2) a (β + 1)-day price sequence P0, . . . , Pβ with the latter β days corresponding to the β rows of
A and B. Furthermore, the values of the population variables X1, . . . ,Xn are feasible with respect
to the price movement on day j if and only if column vector x = (X1, . . . ,Xn)
⊤ satisfies the j-th
constraint in A and B. Also, P0, . . . , Pβ and a description of Π can be computed in O(hβ) time.
Proof: Follows immediately from Equations 3 and 4.
In the AS+PI model we obtain only equations, of the form:
h∑
i=1
SitXi =
1
α
(Pt − Pt−1). (5)
In this case there is a direct correspondence between market data and systems of linear equations.
We formalize this correspondence in Lemmas 3 and 4 below.
Lemma 3 In the AS+PI model with parameters m and α, given Π and a price sequence P0, . . . , Pβ ,
there is a matrix B with coefficients in {−1, 0,+1}, h columns, and β rows, and a column vector b
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of length h, such that the column vectors x = (X1, . . . ,Xh)
⊤ consistent with Π and P0, . . . , Pβ are
exactly those that satisfy Bx = b. The coefficients of B and b can be computed in time O(hβT ),
where T is an upper bound on the time to compute a single Sij from P0, . . . , Pβ over all j ∈ [1, β]
and Si.
Proof: Follows immediately from Equation 5.
Lemma 4 In the AS+PI model with parameters m and α, given a system of linear equations
Bx = b, where B is a β × h matrix with coefficients in {−1, 0,+1}, there exist (1) a set Π of h
strategies corresponding to the h columns of B, and (2) a (β + 1)-day price sequence P0, . . . , Pβ
with the last β days corresponding to the β rows of B. Furthermore, the values of the population
variables X1, . . . ,Xn are feasible with respect to the price movement on day j if and only if column
vector x = (X1, . . . ,Xn)
⊤ satisfies the j-th constraint in B. Also, P0, . . . , Pβ and a description of
Π can be computed in O(hβ) time.
Proof: Follows immediately from Equation 5.
4.2 An Easy Case for Market Prediction: Many Traders but Few Strategies
In Section 4.2.1, we show that if an AS+FI market has far more traders than strategies, then it
takes polynomial time to estimate the probability that the next day’s price will rise. In Section
4.2.2, we discuss why the same analysis technique does not work for an AS+PI market.
4.2.1 Predicting an AS+FI Market
For the sake of emphasizing the dependence on m, let Prm[E] be the probability that event E
occurs when there are m traders in the market.
This section makes the following assumptions:
E1 The input to the market prediction problem is simply a price history P0, . . . , Pt−1. The output
is limm→∞ Prm[Pt > Pt−1 | P0, . . . , Pt−1].
E2 The market follows the AS+FI model.
E3 Π is fixed. The values Sij over all i ∈ [1, h] are computable from the input in total time
polynomial in j.
E4 Each of them traders independently chooses a random strategy Si from Π with fixed probability
pi > 0, where p1 + · · · + ph = 1.
The parameter α is irrelevant.
Notice that the column vector X = (X1, . . . ,Xh)
⊤ is the sum of m independent identically-
distributed vector-valued random variables with a center at p = m·(p1, . . . , ph)⊤. We recenter
and rescale X to Y = (X − m·(p1, . . . , ph)⊤)/
√
m. Then, by the Central Limit Theorem (see,
e.g., [3, Theorem 29.5]), as m → +∞, Y converges weakly to a normal distribution centered at
the h-dimensional vector (0, . . . , 0)⊤. In Theorem 5 below, we rely on this fact to estimate the
probability that the market rises for price histories that occur with nonzero probability.
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Theorem 5 Assume that limm→∞ Prm[P0, . . . , Pt−1] > 0. Then there is a fully polynomial-time
approximation scheme for estimating limm→∞ Prm[Pt > Pt−1 | P0, . . . , Pt−1] from P0, . . . , Pt−1.
The time complexity of the scheme is polynomial in (1) the length t of the price history, (2) the
inverse of the relative error bound ǫ, and (3) the inverse of the failure probability η.
Remark. We omit the explicit dependency of the running time in h and p1, . . . , ph in order to
concentrate on the main point that market prediction is easy with this section’s four assumptions.
The parameters h and p1, . . . , ph are constant under the assumptions.
Proof: We use Lemma 1 to convert the price history P0, . . . , Pt−1 and the strategy set Π into
a system of linear constraints AX > 0 and BX = 0, with the next day’s price change Pt − Pt−1
determined by sign(c·X ′) for some c. Since the values Sij are computable in time polynomial in j,
this conversion takes time polynomial in t.
Then, Prm[P0, . . . , Pt−1] = Prm[AX > 0∧BX = 0]. Since limm→∞ Prm[AX > 0∧BX = 0] > 0,
the constraints in B must be vacuous; in other words, for each Pi = 0 with i ∈ [0, t − 1], the
corresponding constraint in B is 0·X1+ · · ·+0·Xh = 0. Therefore, Prm[P0, . . . , Pt−1] = Prm[AX >
0]. Furthermore, since both A and c are constant with respect to m,
lim
m→∞
Prm[Pt > Pt−1 | P0, . . . , Pt−1] = limm→∞ Prm[AX > 0 ∧ c·X > 0]
limm→∞ Prm[AX > 0]
. (6)
So to compute the desired limm→∞ Prm[Pt > Pt−1 | P0, . . . , Pt−1], we compute limm→∞ Prm[AX >
0 ∧ c·X > 0] and limm→∞ Prm[AX > 0] as follows.
To avoid the degeneracy caused by
∑h
i=1Xi = m, we work with X
′ = (X1, . . . ,Xh−1)
⊤ instead
of X by replacing Xh with m −
∑h−1
i=1 Xi and making related changes. Let p
′ = (p1, . . . , ph−1)
⊤,
which is the center of X ′. As is true for Y , as m → +∞, the vector Y ′ = (X ′ − m·p′)/√m
converges weakly to a normal distribution centered at the (h − 1)-dimensional point (0, . . . , 0)⊤ .
Under the assumption that each pi is nonzero, the distribution of Y
′ is full-dimensional (within
its restricted (h − 1)-dimensional space), as in the limit the variance of each coordinate Y ′i is
nonzero conditioned on the values of the other coordinates, which implies that the smallest subspace
containing the distribution must contain all h− 1 axes. We can calculate the covariance matrix of
Y ′ directly from the pi, as it is equal to the covariance matrix for a single trader: on the diagonal,
Cii = pi − p2i ; and for off-diagonal elements, Cij = −pipj. Given C, Y ′ has density ρ(x) = aex
⊤Cx
for some constant a, and we can evaluate this density in O(h2) time given x, which is O(1) time
under our assumption that Π is fixed.
Let Ai be the i-th constraint of A, i.e., Ai,1X1+ · · ·+Ai,hXh > 0. Let A′i denote the constraint
(Ai,1 −Ai,h, . . . , Ai,h−1 −Ai,h). Let c′ = (c1 − ch, . . . , ch−1 − ch).
We next convert the constraints of A on X into constraints on Y ′. First of all, notice that
AiX =
√
m·(A′iY ′) +m·Aip. So AiX > 0 if and only if A′iY ′ > −
√
m·Aip. The term −
√
m·Aip
may not be constant. In such a case, as m → ∞, the hyper plane bounding the half space
A′iY
′ > −√m·Aip keeps moving away from the origin, which presents some technical complication.
To remove this problem, we analyze the term in three cases. If Aip < 0, then since m·p is the
center of X, as m → ∞, Prm[AiX < 0] converges to 1. In other words, Ai is infeasible with
probability 1 in the limit. Then, since limm→∞ Prm[P0, . . . , Pt−1] > 0, such Ai cannot exist in
A. Similarly, if Aip > 0, then limm→∞ Prm[AiX > 0] = 1 and Ai is vacuous. The interesting
constraints are those for which Aip = 0; in this case, by algebra, AiX > 0 if and only if A
′
iY
′ > 0.
Thus, let D be the matrix formed by these constraints; D can be computed in O(ht) time. Then,
since D is constant with respect to m, limm→∞Prm[AX > 0] = limm→∞ Prm[DY
′ > 0]. Similarly,
Prm[AX > 0 ∧ c·X > 0] converges to (1) 0, (2) Prm[DY ′ > 0], or (3) Prm[DY ′ > 0 ∧ c′·Y ′ > 0] for
case (1) c·p < 0, case (2) c·p > 0, or case (3) c·p = 0, respectively.
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Therefore, by Equation 6, limm→∞ Prm[Pt > Pt−1 | P0, . . . , Pt−1] equals 0 for case (1) and
equals 1 for case (2). Case (3) requires further computation.
lim
m→∞
Prm[Pt > Pt−1 | P0, . . . , Pt−1] = limm→∞Prm[DY
′ > 0 ∧ c′·Y ′ > 0]
limm→∞Prm[DY ′ > 0]
. (7)
The numerator and denominator of the ratio in Equation 7 are both integrals of the distribution
of Y ′ in the limit over the bodies of possibly infinite convex polytopes. To deal with the possible
infiniteness of the convex bodies DY ′ > 0 ∧ c′·Y ′ > 0 and DY ′ > 0, notice that the density
drops exponentially. So we can truncate the regions of integration to some finite radius around
the (h − 1)-dimensional origin (0, . . . , 0)⊤ with only exponentially small loss of precision. Finally,
since the distribution of Y ′ in the limit is normal, by applying the Applegate-Kannan integration
algorithm for log-concave distributions [2] to the numerator and denominator separately, we can
approximate limm→∞ Prm[Pt > Pt−1 | P0, . . . , Pt−1] within the desired time complexity.
4.2.2 Remarks on Predicting an AS+PI Market
The probability estimation technique based on taking m to ∞ does not appear to be applicable to
the AS+PI model for the following reasons.
First of all, by Lemma 3, the input price history induces a system of linear equations BX = b.
If any equation in BX = b is not equivalent to X1 + · · ·+Xh = m or 0·X1 + · · ·+ 0·Xh = 0, then
limm→∞Prm[P0, . . . , Pt−1] = 0.
A natural attempt to overcome this seemingly technical difficulty would be to (1) solve BX = b
to choose a maximal set U of independent variables Xi and (2) evaluate Prm[P0, . . . , Pt−1] in the
probability space induced by this set. Still, a single constraint such as Bi,1·X1+· · ·+Bi,h·Xh = α·m0
with Bi,j ≥ 0 for all j ∈ [1, h] and Bi,j′ > 0 for some Xj′ ∈ U forces limm→∞ Prm[P0, . . . , Pt−1] = 0
in the new probability space. This is due to the fact that m0 is constant with respect to m.
A further attempt would be to evaluate limm→∞Prm[Pt > Pt−1 | P0, . . . , Pt−1] by directly
working with the probability space induced by P0, . . . , Pt−1. This also does not work because we
show below that the market prediction problem can be reduced to the case where taking a limit
in m has no effect on the distribution of the strategy counts. Suppose that we are given a market
which follows the assumptions E1, E3, and E4 of Section 4.2.1 except that this market uses the PI
rule and has m0 traders. We construct a new market with any m ≥ m0 traders with the following
modifications:
1. The price history P0, . . . , Pt−1 is extended with an extra day into P
′
0, . . . , P
′
t−1, P
′
t , where
P ′j = Pj for 0 ≤ j ≤ t− 1. Each strategy Si is extended into a new strategy S ′i where (1) on
day j ∈ [1, t − 1], S ′i(P0, . . . , Pj−1) = Si(P0, . . . , Pj−1), (2) on day t, S ′i always buys, and (3)
on day t+ 1, S ′i(P ′0, . . . , P ′t ) = Si(P0, . . . , Pt−1). Thus, P ′t = P ′t−1 + α·m0.
2. Add a passive strategy S ′h+1 that always holds.
3. Let p′i =
1
2pi for 1 ≤ i ≤ h and p′h+1 = 12 .
Note that since P ′t − P ′t−1 = α·m0, m − m0 traders choose the passive strategy Sh+1. Also, the
new market and the new price history can accommodate any m ≥ m0 traders. Note that because
of the constraint P ′t − P ′t−1 = α·m0, the probability distribution of (X1, · · · ,Xh)⊤ conditioned
on P ′0, . . . , P
′
t in the new market for each m ≥ m0 is identical to the probability distribution of
(X1, · · · ,Xh)⊤ conditioned on P0, . . . , Pt−1 in the original market with m = m0. Furthermore,
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Prm[P
′
t+1 > P
′
t | P ′0, . . . , P ′t ] = Prm0 [Pt > Pt−1 | P0, . . . , Pt−1]. So we have obtained the desired
reduction.
Consequently, we are left with a situation where the number of active strategies may be com-
parable to the number of traders. Such a market turns out to be very hard to predict, as shown
next in Section 4.3.
4.3 A Hard Case for Market Prediction: Many Strategies
Section 4.2 shows that predicting an AS+FI market is easy (i.e., takes polynomial time) when the
numberm of traders vastly exceeds the number h of strategies. In this section, we consider the case
where every trader may have a distinct strategy, and show that predicting an AS+FI or AS+PI
market becomes very hard indeed.
We now define two decision-problem versions of market prediction. Both versions make the
following assumption:
• Each Xi is independently either 0 or 1 with equal probability.
The bounded market prediction problem is:
• Input: a set of n passive strategies and a price history spanning n days such that the proba-
bility that the market rises on day n+1 conditioned on the price history is either (1) greater
than 2/3 or (2) less than 1/3.
• Question: Which case is it, case (1) or case (2)?
The unbounded market prediction problem is:
• Input: a set of n passive strategies and a price history spanning n days.
• Question: Is the probability that the market rises on day n + 1 conditioned on the price
history greater than 1/2 (without the usual ǫ term)?
The unbounded market prediction problem has less financial payoff than the bounded one due
to different probability thresholds. For each of these two problems, there are in effect two versions,
depending on which price increment rule is used; however, both versions turn out to be equally
hard. These two problems can be analyzed by similar techniques, and our discussion below focuses
on the bounded market prediction problem with a hardness theorem for the unbounded market
prediction problem in Section 4.3.4.
We show in Section 4.3.1 how to construct passive strategies and price histories such that
solving bounded market prediction is equivalent to estimating the probability that a Boolean
circuit outputs 1 on a random input conditioned on a second circuit outputting 1. In Section
4.3.2, we show that this problem is hard for PNP[O(logn)] and complete for a class that lies between
PNP[O(logn)] and PP. Thus bounded market prediction is not merely NP-hard, but cannot be solved
in the polynomial-time hierarchy at all unless the hierarchy collapses to a finite level.
4.3.1 Reductions from Circuits to Markets
Lemma 6 converts a circuit into a system of linear inequalities, while Lemma 7 converts a system
of linear inequalities into a system of linear equations. These systems can then be converted into
AS+FI and AS+PI market models using Lemmas 2 and 4, respectively.
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Note that the restriction in Lemma 6 to circuits consisting of 2-input NOR gates is not an
obstacle to representing arbitrary combinatorial circuits (with constant blow-up), as 2-input NOR
gates are universal.
Lemma 6 For any n-input Boolean circuit C consisting of m 2-input NOR gates, there exists a
system Ax > 0 of 3m+2 linear constraints in n+m+2 unknowns and a length n+m+2 column
vector c with the following properties:
1. Both A and c have coefficients in {−1, 0,+1} that can be computed in time O((n+m)2).
2. Any 0-1 vector (x1, . . . , xn) has a unique 0-1 extension x = (x1, . . . , xn, xn+1, . . . xn+m+2)
satisfying Ax > 0.
3. If Ax > 0, then cx > 0 if and only if C(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = 1.
Proof: Let xn+k represent the output of the k-th NOR gate, where 1 ≤ k ≤ m. Without loss
of generality we assume that gate m is the output gate.
The variables xn+m+1 and xn+m+2 are dummies to allow for a zero right-hand-side in Ax > 0;
our first two constraints are xn+m+1 > 0 and xn+m+2 > 0.
Suppose gate k has inputs xi and xj . The NOR operation is implemented by the following
three linear inequalities:
xi + xn+k < 2;
xj + xn+k < 2;
xi + xj + xn+k > 0.
The first two constraints ensure that the output is never 1 if an input is 1, while the last requires that
the output is 1 if both inputs are 0; the constraints are thus satisfied if and only if xn+k = ¬(xi∨xj).
Using the dummy variables, the first two constraints are written as
−xi − xn+k + xn+m+1 + xn+m+2 > 0;
−xj − xn+k + xn+m+1 + xn+m+2 > 0.
Let Ax > 0 be the system obtained by combining all of these inequalities. Then for each
(x1, . . . , xn), Ax > 0 determines xn+k for all k ≥ 1. The vector c is chosen so that cx = xn+m.
One might suspect that the fixed increment rule’s ability to hide the exact values of the left-hand
side of each constraint is critical to disguise the inner workings of the circuit. However, by adding
slack variables we can translate the inequalities into equations, allowing the use of a proportional
increment rule without revealing extra information.
Lemma 7 Let Ax > 0 be a system of m linear inequalities in n variables where A has coefficients
in {−1, 0,+1}. Then there is a system By = 1 of mn−m+1 linear equations in 2mn−3m+n+1
variables with the following properties:
1. B has coefficients in {−1, 0,+1} that can be computed in time O((mn)2).
2. There is a bijection f : x 7→ y between the 0-1 solutions x to Ax > 0 and the 0-1 solutions y
to By = 1, such that xj = yj for 1 ≤ j ≤ n whenever y = f(x).
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Proof: For each 1 ≤ i ≤ m, let Ai be the constraint
∑
j Aijxj > 0. To turn these inequalities
into equations, we add slack variables to soak up any excess over 1, with some additional care taken
to ensure that there is a unique assignment to the slack variables for each setting of the variables
xj .
We will use the following 0-1 variables, which we think of as alternate names for y1 through
y2mn−3m+n+1:
Variables Purpose Indices Count
xj original variables 1 ≤ j ≤ n n
u constant 1 none 1
sij slack variables for Ai 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ n− 1 m(n− 1)
tij slack variables for sij ≥ si,j+1 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ n− 2 m(n− 2)
Name Equation Purpose Indices Count
U u = 1 set u none 1
Bi
∑
j Aijxj −
∑
j sij = 1 represent Ai 1 ≤ i ≤ m m
Sij sij − si,j+1 − tij + u = 1 require sij ≥ si,j+1 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ n− 2 m(n− 2)
Observe that for each i,
∑
j sij can take on any integer value σi between 0 and n− 1, and that
for any fixed value of σi, the Sij constraints uniquely determine the values of sij and tij for all j.
So each constraint Bi permits χi =
∑
j Aijxj to take on precisely the same values 1 to n that Ai
does, and each χi uniquely determines σi and thus the assignment of all sij and tij .
4.3.2 Conditional Probability Complexity Classes
Suppose that we take a polynomial-time probabilistic Turing machine, fix its inputs, and use the
usual Cook’s Theorem construction to turn it into a circuit whose inputs are the random bits used
during its computation. Then, we can feed the resulting circuit to Lemmas 6 and 2 to obtain an
AS+FI market model in which there is exactly one assignment of population variables for each set
of random bits, and the price rises on the last day if and only if the output of the Turing machine is
1. By applying Lemma 7 to the intermediate system of linear inequalities, we can similarly convert
a circuit to an AS+PI model. It follows that bounded market prediction is BPP-hard for either
model. But with some cleverness, we can exploit the conditioning on past history to show that
bounded market prediction is in fact much harder than this. We do so in Section 4.3.3, after a
brief detour through computational complexity in this section.
We proceed to define some new counting classes based on conditional probabilities. One of
these, BCPP, has the useful feature that bounded market prediction is BCPP-complete. We will
use this fact to relate the complexity of bounded market prediction to more traditional complexity
classes.
The usual counting classes of complexity theory (PP, BPP, R, ZPP, C=, etc.) are defined
in terms of counting the relative numbers of accepting and rejecting states of a nondeterministic
Turing machine. We will define a new family of counting classes by adding a third decision state
that does not count for the purposes of determining acceptance or rejection.
A noncommittal Turing machine is a nondeterministic Turing machine with three decision
states: accept, reject, and abstain. We represent a noncommittal Turing machine as a deterministic
Turing machine which takes a polynomial number of random bits in addition to its input; each
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assignment of the random bits gives a distinct computation path. A computation path is accept-
ing/rejecting/abstaining if it ends in an accept/reject/abstain state, respectively. We often write
1, 0, or ⊥ as shorthand for the output of an accepting, rejecting, or abstaining path.
Conditional versions of the usual counting classes are obtained by carrying over their definitions
from standard nondeterministic Turing machines to noncommittal Turing machines, with some care
in handling the case of no accepting or rejecting paths. We can still think of these modified classes
as corresponding to probabilistic machines, but now the probabilities we are interested in are
conditioned on not abstaining.
Definition 8 The conditional probabilistic polynomial-time class (CPP) consists of those languages
L for which there exists a polynomial-time noncommittal Turing machine M such that x ∈ L if
and only if the number of accepting paths when M is run with input x exceeds the number of
rejecting paths.
Definition 9 The bounded conditional probabilistic polynomial-time class (BCPP) consists of those
languages L for which there exists a constant ǫ > 0 and a polynomial-time noncommittal Turing
machine M such that (1) x ∈ L implies that a fraction of at least 12 + ǫ of the total number of
accepting and rejecting paths are accepting and (2) x /∈ L implies that a fraction of at least 12 + ǫ
of the total number of accepting and rejecting paths are rejecting.
Definition 10 The conditional randomized polynomial-time class (CR) consists of those languages
L for which there exists a constant ǫ > 0 and a polynomial-time noncommittal Turing machine
M such that (1) x ∈ L implies that a fraction of at least ǫ of the total number of accepting and
rejecting paths are accepting, and (2) x /∈ L implies that there are no accepting paths.
As we show in Theorems 11 and 12, CPP and CR turn out to be the same as the unconditional
classes PP and NP, respectively.
Theorem 11 CPP = PP.
Proof: First of all, PP ⊆ CPP because a PP machine is a CPP machine that happens
not to have any abstaining paths. For the inverse direction, represent each abstaining path of a
CPP machine by a pair consisting of one accepting and one rejecting path, and each accepting or
rejecting path by two accepting or rejecting paths. Then the resulting PP machine accepts if and
only if the CPP machine does.
Theorem 12 CR = NP.
Proof: To show NP ⊆ CR, replace each rejecting path of an NP machine with an abstaining
path in a CR machine. For the inverse direction, replace each abstaining path of the CR machine
with a rejecting path in the NP machine.
BCPP appears to be a more interesting class. Since it is clearly a subset of CPP, we have:
Corollary 13 BCPP ⊆ PP.
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Proof: Immediate from Theorem 11 and the definition of BCPP and CPP.
On the other hand, BCPP appears to be much stronger than the analogous non-conditional
class BPP. For example, it is straightforward to show that NP ⊆ BPP. Use the representation of
an NP-machine as a deterministic machine M that takes some polynomial number of “hint” bits
in addition to its input, and replace these N hint bits with N random bits r. In addition, supply
another 2N random bits r′, which will be used to amplify the conditional probability of accepting
paths. Now let M ′(x, r, r′) accept if M(x, r) accepts; reject if M(x, r) rejects and r′ = ~0; and
abstain if M(x, r) rejects and r′ 6= ~0. Then if M has any accepting path on input x, M ′ has at
least 22N accepting paths and at most 2N−1 rejecting paths, for an exponentially large probability
of accepting— since we have amplified the small number of accepting paths so that they overwhelm
the few rejectors. Alternatively, if M(x, r) never accepts, neither does M ′.
By repeating this sort of amplification of “good” paths, we can in fact simulate O(log n) queries
of an NP-oracle, as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 14 PNP[O(logn)] ⊆ BCPP.
Proof: Let M(x, h1, h2, . . . , hk) be a deterministic implementation a P
NP[O(logn)] machine,
where k = O(log n) and each hi supplies a witness for the i-th oracle query. We will show that the
language L(M) accepted by M is in BCPP.
To simplify the presentation, we assume that each oracle query is a Boolean formula with a fixed
number m of variables, where m is polynomial in n = |x|, and that hi is an assignment for those
variables. We assume that M consists of a sequence of functions M1,M2, . . . ,Mk for generating
oracle queries, a set of k verifiers V1, . . . , Vk for verifying the witnesses hi, and a combining function
M∗ that produces the output from the input and the outputs of the Vi. Each function Mi takes as
input the input |x| and the outputs of V1 through Vi−1. Vi sees the output of Mi and the input hi.
M∗ sees the input |x| and the outputs of V1 through Vk. The output of the combined machine M
is the output of any computation path where hi is chosen so that Vi(Mi, hi) = 1 whenever such an
hi exists. In other words, we demand that hi be a satisfying assignment when possible, and ignore
those paths where satisfiable queries are issued but satisfying assignments are not supplied.
We will represent M with a noncommittal machine M ′(x, r1, . . . , rk, r
′), where each ri is a
random bit-vector replacing the corresponding hi, and r
′ is an extra supply of random bits used to
amplify the good computation paths to overwhelm the bad ones. This amplification process is a
little complicated, because it is not enough to amplify paths that find good witnesses to particular
queries; it may be that a bad witness for an earlier query causes some Mi to issue a different
query from the correct one. So we must amplify a path that finds a witness to query i enough to
overwhelm not only the exponentially many invalid witnesses to query i, but also the exponentially
many valid witnesses that might be returned to instances queries i + 1 through k based on an
incorrect answer to query i.
Let v = (v1, v2, . . . , vk) be the vector of outputs of Vi. For each v, we define an amplification
exponent A(v) as follows:
A(v) =
k∑
i=1
vi2
k−i(mk + 1).
We will write Ai for the coefficient 2
(k−i)(mk + 1); these coefficients Ai are chosen to make Equa-
tion 8 work below.
Now let M ′(x, r1, . . . , rk, r
′) = M(x, r1, . . . , rk) whenever r
′
i = 0 for all i > A(v), where
v is the output of V1 through Vk in the computation of M . If r
′
i 6= 0 for some i > A(v),
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M ′(x, r1, . . . , rk, r
′) =⊥. The effect of the r′ bits is to set the weight of each non-abstaining
path to 2A(v).
Clearly M ′ can be computed in polynomial time as long as |r′| is polynomial. The number of
r′ bits needed is the maximum value of A(v), which is (mk+1)(2k+1 − 1) = O(nck2h). For this to
be polynomial, we need k = O(log n).
A good path p is precisely one for which each vi is the correct output of the NP-oracle. A bad
path p′ is one in which one or more of the v′i values is incorrect. We will match bad paths with
good paths, and show that the weight of each good path is much larger than the total weight of
all bad paths mapped to it.
Identify each path with the sequence r1, . . . , rk that generates it. Let b = b1, . . . , bk generate
some bad path. Let i be the first point at which bi is an invalid witness to a satisfiable query. Then
there is a good path a = a1, . . . , ak such that aj = bj for j < i. Furthermore, if v
a and vb are the
vectors of verifier outputs for a and b, then not only is vaj = v
b
j for j < i, but also v
a
i = 1 while
vbi = 0 since the only false verifier outputs are false negatives.
The maximum value for A(vb) is obtained if vbj = 1 for j > i; so we have
A(va)−A(vb) ≥

i−1∑
j=1
Ajv
a
j +Ai

−

i−1∑
j=1
Ajv
b
j +
k∑
j=i+1
Aj

 = Ai − k∑
j=i+1
Aj .
Now
Ai = 2
k−i(mk + 1) = (mk + 1) +
k∑
j=i+1
2k−j(mk + 1) = (mk + 1) +
k∑
j=i+1
Aj , (8)
so Ai −
∑k
j=i+1Aj = mk + 1. But the ratio between the weight of b and its corresponding good
path a is then at most 2A(v
b)−A(va) = 2−mk−1. Since there are only 2mk paths altogether, there
are fewer than 2mk bad paths; thus, the ratio between the total weight of all bad paths mapped
to a and the weight of a is less than 2mk2−mk−1 = 12 . Summing over all good paths shows that
the total weight of all bad paths is less than half the total weight of all good paths, so at least 23
of all non-abstaining paths are good. It follows that, conditioned on not abstaining, M ′ accepts
with probability greater than 23 if M accepts, and accepts with probability less than
1
3 if M rejects.
Hence L(M) ∈ BCPP.
An interesting open question is where exactly BCPP lies between PNP[O(logn)] and PP. It is
conceivable that by cleverly exploiting the power of conditioning to amplify low-probability events
one could show BCPP = PP. However, we will content ourselves with the much easier result of
showing that the usual amplification technique for BPP also applies to BCPP.
Theorem 15 If L ∈ BCPP, then there exists a noncommittal Turing machine M such that the
probability that M accepts conditioned on not abstaining is at least 1 − f(n) if x ∈ L and at most
f(n) if x /∈ L, where n = |x| and f(n) is any function of the form 2−O(nc) for some constant c > 0.
Proof: Let membership in L be computed by M ′. Assume x ∈ L (the case x /∈ L is
symmetric). Consider k independent executions of M ′ with input x; call the random variables
representing their outputs Y1, Y2, . . . , Yk. Because the executions are independent, for any 0-1
vector of values yi Pr[∀iYi = yi | ∀iYi 6=⊥] =
∏
i Pr[Yi = yi | Yi 6=⊥]. So conditioning on
no abstentions,
∑
i Yi has a binomial distribution with p =
1
2 + ǫ, and Chernoff bounds imply
Pr[
∑
i Yi <
k
2 | ∀iYi 6=⊥] is exponentially small in kǫ. Since ǫ is constant and we can make k
polynomially large in n, the result follows.
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4.3.3 Bounded Market Prediction Is BCPP-complete
In Section 4.3.2, we have defined the complexity class BCPP and have shown that it contains the
powerful class PNP[O(logn)]. In this section, we show that bounded market prediction is complete
for BCPP. In a sense, this result says that market prediction is a universal prediction problem: if
we can predict a market, we can predict any event conditioned on past history as long as we can
sample from an underlying discrete probability space whose size is at most exponential.
It also says that bounded market prediction is very hard. That is, using Theorems 15 and 14,
even if the next day’s price is determined with all but an exponentially small probability, it cannot
be solved in the polynomial-time hierarchy unless the hierarchy collapses to a finite level.
Theorem 16 The bounded market prediction problem is complete for BCPP, in either the AS+FI
or the AS+PI model.
Proof: First we show that bounded market prediction is a member of BCPP. Given a market,
construct a noncommittal Turing machine M whose input is the price history and strategies, and
whose random inputs supply the settings for the population variables Xi. Let M abstain if the
price history is inconsistent with the input and population variables; depending on the model,
this is either a matter of checking the linear inequalities produced by Lemma 1 or the equations
produced by Lemma 3. Otherwise, M accepts if the market rises and rejects if the market falls on
the next day. The probability that M accepts thus equals the probability that the market rises:
either more than 2/3 or less than 1/3. Since the problem is to distinguish between these two cases,
M solves the problem within the definition of a BCPP-machine.
In the other direction, we reduce from any BCPP-language L. Suppose L is accepted by some
BCPP-machineM . We will translateM and its input x into a bounded market prediction problem.
First use Theorem 15 to amplify the conditional probability thatM accepts to either more than 2/3
or less than 1/3 as bounded market prediction demands. Then convert M into two polynomial-size
circuits, one computing
C 6⊥(r) =
{
0 if M(x, r) =⊥;
1 if M(x, r) 6=⊥,
and the other computing
C1(r) =
{
0 if M(x, r) 6= 1;
1 if M(x, r) = 1.
Without loss of generality we may assume that C 6⊥ and C1 are built from NOR gates. Applying
Lemma 6 to each yields two sets of constraints A6⊥y > 0 and A1y > 0 and column vectors c6⊥
and c1 such that c6⊥y > 0 if and only if C 6⊥y = 1 and c1x > 0 if and only if C1(x) = 1, where y
satisfies the previous linear constraints and x is the initial prefix of y consisting of variables not
introduced by the construction of Lemma 6. We also have from Lemma 6 that there is a one-to-
one correspondence between assignments of x and assignments of y satisfying the A constraints, so
probabilities are not affected by this transformation.
Now use Lemma 2 to construct a market model in which A6⊥y > 0, A1y > 0, and c6⊥y > 0 are
enforced by the strategies and price history, and sign(c1y) determines the price change on the next
day of trading. Thus the consistent settings of the variables Xi are precisely those corresponding
to settings of r for which C 6⊥(r) = 1, or, in other words, those yielding computation paths that do
not abstain. The market rises when C1(r) = 1, or when M accepts. So if we can predict whether
the market rises or falls with conditional probability at least 2/3, we can predict the likely output
of M . It follows that bounded market prediction for the AS+FI model is BCPP-hard.
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To show the similar result for the AS+PI model, use Lemma 7 to convert the constraints
A6⊥y > 0, A1y > 0 into a system of linear equations Bz = 1, and then proceed as before, using
Lemma 4 to convert this system to a price history and letting c1z determine the price change (and
thus the sign of the price change) on the next day of trading.
4.3.4 Unbounded Market Prediction is CPP-complete
The unbounded market prediction problem seems harder because the probability threshold in
question is 12 with no ǫ bound in contrast to the thresholds
2
3 and
1
3 for the bounded market
prediction problem. The following theorem reflects this intuition. However, since we do not know
whether BCPP is distinct from PP, we do not know whether unbounded prediction is strictly
harder.
Theorem 17 The unbounded market prediction problem is complete for CPP = PP, in either the
AS+FI or the AS+PI model.
Proof: Similar to the proof of Theorem 16.
5 Future Research Directions
There are many problems left open in this paper. Below we briefly discuss some general directions
for further research.
We have reported a number of simulation and theoretical results for the AS model. As for
empirical analysis, it would be of interest to fit actual market data to the model. We can then
use the estimated parameters to (1) test whether the model has any predicative power and (2)
test the effectiveness of new or known trading algorithms. This direction may require carefully
choosing “realistic” strategies for Π. Besides the momentum and contrarian strategies, there are
some popular ones which are worth considering, such as those based on support levels. Investment
newsletters could be a useful source of such strategies.
The AS model is an idealized one. We have chosen such simplicity as a matter of research
methodology. It is relatively easy to design highly complicated models which can generate very
complex market behavior. A more challenging and interesting task is to design the simplest possible
model which can generate the desired market characteristics. For instance, a significant research
direction would be to find the simplest model in which market prediction is computationally hard.
On the other hand, it would be of great interest to find the most general models in which market
prediction takes only polynomial time. For this goal, we can consider injecting more realism into
the model by introducing resource-bounded learning (the generality of Π is equivalent to unbounded
learning), variable memory size, transaction costs, buying power, limit orders, short sell, options,
etc.
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